by Hasan Hafidh @HasHafidh
[Editor’s note: According to the European Union, “The principle of subsidiarity is defined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. It ensures that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made to verify that action at Union level is justified in light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the areas that fall within its exclusive competence), unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level. It is closely bound up with the principle of proportionality, which requires that any action by the Union should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”]
In order to assess the expediency of subsidiarity within the political sphere, it must be acknowledged what the concept of subsidiarity entails and more importantly to understand its tacit theological origins within Catholic social doctrine and how the principle is affiliated with notions of the common good or socially generated values such as altruism and solidarity. By understanding the provenance of subsidiarity, this will offer an insight into how religion has utilised organisation principles such as subsidiarity in its interaction with policy makers. This paper will also observe the function subsidiarity plays within contemporary politics, particularly within EU policy and legislation and will assess the impact it has on regional politics within Europe. With this in mind, this paper will look at the arguments for the practice of subsidiarity that do not specifically allude to further decentralisation of government but rather a compromise in policies of centralisation and decentralisation and will finally look at the criticisms of subsidiarity in the way that more centralised governments could appear to function more efficiently, particularly within economics. Taking all the aforementioned into account, this will lead to the conclusive argument that rather than being a debate on the effectiveness of centralised or decentralised forms of governance, the evidence will ultimately highlight how subsidiarity recognises the mutual dependence of both State and Community in achieving its full potential in executing policies, legislation, etc. and, more significantly, it aims to establish some form of social order, linking back to the broader values subsidiarity embodies by its theological affiliation.
According to the Oxford Dictionary, subsidiarity in its generic understanding holds the idea that a central authority should acquire a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at an immediate or local level. Subsidiarity in practice implies that a matter ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest or least central authority capable of addressing that matter effectively. In essence, it is the principle of devolving decisions to the lowest practical level. Examples of subsidiarity at work could consist of how certain provinces within a country may let its school board choose which teachers shall teach in which schools or how a country offers jurisdiction to a certain region or province in deciding what its speed limit on roads should be.
However, when subsidiarity is portrayed in the political context, definitions of subsidiarity can differ depending on whether one is a proponent or against subsidiarity at work, therefore lessening or extending its scope of influence on a practical level. One definition that advocates subsidiarity identifies the importance of individual action being paramount so long as it does not disturb the institutional equilibrium. ‘Subsidiarity should help to assure the citizen that decisions will be taken as closely as possible to the citizen himself, without damaging the advantages which he gains from common action at the level of the whole community and without changing the institutional balance.’ In contrast to this definition, critics of practical subsidiarity will not specifically dismiss the notion altogether but will rather devalue its importance within the political sphere, stressing the importance of the centralised State by administering authority to a regional or communal level only where the State cannot exert its influence as effectively, alluding to the point that subsidiarity should be perceived as a measure of last resort, whereas proponents of subsidiarity would depict it as a necessity for the centralised state to function productively. A definition that argues for the precedence of a centralised form of government states that ‘the Community shall take action only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved by the Community.’
Subsidiarity in practice implies that a matter ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest or least central authority capable of addressing that matter effectively.
One key thinker who was a proponent of subsidiarity in its practical function was John Locke. According to Locke, the State only acquires authority where subordinate powers are insufficient in dealing with issues concerning justice and security. Locke devalues the significance of the State by claiming that its primary function is to safeguard the interests of its citizens and it is those interests that are usually enacted from local level policy making. In this sense, Locke’s understanding of the State could be seen as a justification for action at a subordinate level. Locke prioritised ‘an individualistic society where the necessity of the State arises from the incapacity of the entities at lower levels to resolve particular problems.’ It was during Locke’s period, and in particular, the 18th Century, where advocates of subsidiarity popularised the concept within an intellectual milieu. It was around this period where the economic theory of physiocracy was formed and the supposed benefits of decentralisation were expounded. Physiocrats, such as founder Francois Quesnay, believed in the restriction of State intervention within the economy and instead thought that the State’s role should be confined to issues relating to defence and public order. Likewise with Locke, ‘The physiocrats placed the individual at the centre of their value system and the effect of this new philosophy was the individualistic society.’
In a bureaucratic sense, the principle of subsidiarity does not demote the higher authorities function in society but rather each level of government should be designated to its appropriate standing. This entails that the principle of subsidiarity does generally favour decentralisation for reasons of practicality. ‘Hence, the distribution of responsibilities among different layers- that is the market, decentral authority, national States and supranational entities- is primarily a question of economic and social efficiency.’ It is therefore within this context that subsidiarity can be assessed on its allocation of authority between the European Union and its Community Members, i.e. the nations that collectively make up the EU.
It would be assumed that subsidiarity was actualised from an abstract concept into practical policy making when in 1992 ‘it became a central pillar of the constitutional definition of the Treaty of Maastricht.’ This treaty was significant in the history of the EU not only for the inevitable creation of the Euro, but the formation of a pillar structure was to extend the ECC’s (European Economic Community) influence in various social sectors including the military, judicial cooperation and foreign policy, and was in response to the public perception that democratic elements ought to be established within the EU. However, the origins of the principle of subsidiarity can be traced back even earlier than the Roman Catholic Church’s endorsement of the concept when Pope Leo XIII published the encyclical Rerum Novarum or ‘On the New ThingsI’. According to French political philosopher Chantal Millon-Delsol, the ideological origins of subsidiarity were instigated by Aristotle’s ‘civic existence’ ideal. Aristotle sheds light on the concept in an attempt to determine a competent mode of power sharing within an organisation or system, with the prospect that each individual echelon of authority executes its set responsibilities to the best of its ability. For Aristotle, subsidiarity was the key strategy to acquiring a dual capacity of both higher and lower powers asserting their authority within their respective positions. ‘It is traditionally construed as ensuring that decisions and actions must be taken, where possible, at the level of authority closest to individual citizens; but equally, on the premise of effectiveness, subsidiarity can both justify and require action at higher levels of authority.’
Regardless of Aristotle’s subtle inferences towards subsidiarity, it was Thomas Aquinas (who although he had not defined the concept outright) was to comment explicitly on the potential functions a principle like subsidiarity could have within society and went on to implement it within Catholic social doctrine. He did so by placing priority on individual liberties as well as liberty to action which aimed to realise a common social good. Likewise, he believed that the aims of collective action should be administered by higher authorities as the individual is incapable of implementing such measures. It is within this context that Aquinas offers a decisive role to the higher powers in place (namely the State), but unlike his co-advocates in Locke and the physiocrat movement, Aquinas construed the notion to not only be an efficient organisation principle that could be implemented within government and economic establishments, but furthermore how a principle like subsidiarity could also be affiliated to moral attributes, again linking back to the initial hypothesis that the principle holds an association with social values of altruism and solidarity for example. ‘The State could then contribute to the development and improvement of one’s well-being. Aquinas’s principle of totality implies that society pursues common good- that is the greater good of society … Moreover, it implies that one seeks to serve the common interest before his or her own.’
In addition to this, Aquinas signifies how Catholic social doctrine offers an extension to the social functions of subsidiarity and should not be excluded to the political realm. Rather Aquinas saw diversity within the application of subsidiarity, in that it can be used as a template for efficient relationships across various organisations and communities including educational institutions (schools and universities), churches, clubs, and labour organisations and is even applicable to the private sphere of family life. Pope Pius XI (who was to define the notion of subsidiarity) alludes to this point being a fundamental tenet of Catholic social teaching within the 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno in which he states that, ‘Catholic social theory cast society as a complex web of family, social, religious, and governmental ties with the ultimate goal of encouraging and empowering the individual exercise of responsibility.’ This point of how both Aquinas and later the Papal authority would go on to advocate the wider functions of subsidiarity outside the political framework, gives an indication that subsidiarity was to play an integral part in establishing the Catholic vision of correct order and would not only place importance on the Church’s interaction within the State but also with wider social communities. As ‘Aquinas’s discussion of city, province and empire, as well as many other forms of human community of his time, has the potential, therefore, to shed a great deal of light on the concept of subsidiarity within Catholic social teaching, particularly in terms of its political implications, but always understood within the context of a wider social theory.’
For Aristotle, subsidiarity was the key strategy to acquiring a dual capacity of both higher and lower powers asserting their authority within their respective positions.
Developing on from Aquinas’s philosophy of moral individualism, it was the Papal authority that would transfer this organisation principle and utilise it for moral teaching, in that Pope Pius XI was to recognise subsidiarity as a reorganisation of the responsibilities of each authoritative echelon, bringing together the role of intermediate association. This was instrumental in giving precedence to the role distribution between various social levels and Catholic social thought deemed this to be a fairer process, by introducing a system that made social responsibility relative to each social level, whether it is the State acting as the highest authority all the way to the individual’s responsibility within their own Community. In this sense, Pope Pius XI believed it would therefore place no disproportionate burden on any particular level that was not to be required and in turn this just distribution of responsibility will make for a more effective approach to tackling social issues. Within the encyclical he states, ‘It is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So too, it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order, to transfer to the larger and higher collectively functions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies.’
Referring back to the initial question of subsidiarity’s function within the political sphere, the idea of a just distribution of responsibility would become instrumental even in contemporary politics as it would not only set a precedent for the responsibilities assigned to each social stratum, but more significantly it highlighted the need for altogether reform of social institutions, which effectively revised the existing presumptions of the role of State intervention within society. In addition, the Pope’s perception of subsidiarity would again signify Catholic teaching’s attempt of reviving the notion of a common social good by justifying subsidiarity as a just means to restructuring social and political entities.
On the other hand, subsidiarity acting as a principle in bringing about notions of social justice (that were particularly advocated by Aquinas) could also be perceived in a distinctly different light, particularly within the field of economics where subsidiarity could be applied as a stratagem for what could be only be described as motives of self-interest. This would be antithetical to Aquinas’s view of subsidiarity, which holds the assertion that subsidiarity is a blueprint to generating altruistic values within society. As stated, ‘This concern for fairness, equity and justice is characteristic of Aquinas’s philosophy, but contrasts sharply with the prevailing axiom in economics concerning the pursuit of the self-interest. While Aquinas saw a role for the State in establishing the just price (wage), economists such as Adam Smith felt that this role was to be played by the market.’ This point indicates how subsidiarity not only serves different purposes within different social entities, i.e. within politics or economics, but the ideological affiliations subsidiarity acquires can differ depending on which setting it is placed within, as many critics of the practical application of subsidiarity and policies of decentralisation derives from its position within the economic sphere, which will be discussed further on.
One issue that essentially complements the prevailing question of the extent of subsidiarity’s purpose within politics is by understanding how the principle is generally accepted within contemporary politics. The most evident cases that are known to have plausible links with subsidiarity are in the example of federalism within the United States and within the founding principles of the European Union. This paper will specifically observe policy and legislation arising from the European Union in order to assess whether the principle serves a practical function. As previously mentioned, the political application of subsidiarity has explicitly been cited within the 1992 Maastricht Treaty in which Article 3b stipulates, “further Community action en route to political and monetary union shall be undertaken only if the same objective cannot be ‘sufficiently achieved’ by the individual member states and can therefore be ‘better achieved’ by the Community.” This quote relates back to the definition that critics of decentralisation offer in the wake of practical subsidiarity being applied within European politics. In this instance, critics would argue that although it may occupy a presence within EU legislation in an attempt to retain national sovereignty against the backdrop of the EU occupying a supranational influence over its member states. It in fact indicates subsidiarity’s political position to be de facto void and ambiguous as it demotes the influence of Community action as it is restricted to a political agreement that inevitably serves national interests. As ‘What matters and decides the overall character of federal union is not whether a particular level of government possesses or does not possess certain powers, but instead whether national governments regard their own regulation of certain matters as sufficient or not.’
In addition, the Pope’s perception of subsidiarity would again signify Catholic teaching’s attempt of reviving the notion of a common social good by justifying subsidiarity as a just means to restructuring social and political entities.
This is significant in understanding subsidiarity’s presence and the subsequent role it plays in European politics as it could be deemed minimal in that any form of Community action still requires permission from the central State, in this regard its authority has been undermined because of its lack of autonomy in executing policies within its own jurisdiction. In addition, the Pope’s proposal for a just distribution of social responsibility could also be criticised in this context, as it indicates the role of subordinate bodies (such as the Community) to be void of any political influence by its own regard.
In this instance, it may be deemed adequate to consider subsidiarity as a philosophical political principle as it could often lead to confusion when attempts are made to practically implement the idea, which according to Derek Hearl has not been assisted by the Maastricht Treaty’s definition of the concept. ‘This vagueness is compounded by the wording which is always a reference to the principle of subsidiarity without ever really defining it in concrete terms. Nor is it clear from the text whether it is an over-riding principle or not … There is a profound ambiguity about its use as a barrier to federalism … Because it is invoked as an undefined principle, it has wider implications than sometimes assumed … The Treaty does not make it clear by whom, or how, the principle is to be put into operation … Enforcement is widely seen as a problem.’
However, Hearl also comments on how Former European Commission President Jacques Delors was also dissatisfied with the Treaty’s definition of the principle. This would be instrumental in the way subsidiarity both shows its presence and acquires influence within the political framework by way of the ‘inter-institutional agreement’. Delors drafted the agreement in a bid to attain the political pre-requisites in order for an EU Member State to be implementing the principle of subsidiarity. Member States ‘must at least incorporate the following: a less comprehensive and less detailed legislative programme, a more balanced attribution of tasks between the Union, its member states and regional and local governments and a clearer distinction between decisions which may have to be taken at higher levels and implementation which need not.’ Delors amendments of the Maastricht Treaty were not only instrumental in debunking some of the presumptions surrounding subsidiarity which led to what he construed to be its misapplication within the political framework, but by singling out specific attributes that are required to utilise subsidiarity, it not only gave the idea a political meaning, moreover it was to have an effect on the way in which higher authorities (such as the EU) interacted with regional level policy makers. This can be demonstrated in the case of the German Lander and its perspective on European environmental policy.
From the outset of subsidiarity being introduced, it would be safe to concede that the principle was relatively unfamiliar with many of the EU’s Member States. Over time, however, it progressively became assimilated as acquiring a close proximity with the individual citizen and was therefore instrumental in the EU’s reconstruction from a European Community into what it is recognised today as the European Union. Likewise with President Delors, the German Lander (or colloquially recognised as Bundesland meaning ‘federated state’) were too concerned with the stipulations presented by the Maastricht Treaty, particularly when contextualising the principle of subsidiarity vis-à-vis the EU. The German Landers thought the treaty to be insufficient in its explanation of subsidiarity as it highlighted, ‘A concern for the relationship between the European Union and the Member States and failed to address the relationship between the Union and lower political levels. It was also based on an understanding of subsidiarity which implies a top-down relationship between the Community and lower levels … (This in turn gave the principle less significance as it dismissed the importance of lower level authority in formulating decisions within their respective Community.) In the opinion of the German Lander this top-down relationship should be reversed because, according to the subsidiarity principle, social and political tasks should only be given to a larger Community if they are beyond the capabilities and resources of the smaller Community.’
The Lander’s insistence of a revised definition and understanding of subsidiarity has related back to the question of subsidiarity’s presence and whether it occupies a practical function within politics, as it was the understanding that subsidiarity should proceed down the regional/communal levels as oppose to being regulated by the EU and its Member States which ultimately gave rise to the 13 Theses. A document that highlighted subsidiarity’s influence and purpose in that it aimed to provide justifications as to why subsidiarity should maintain its position across all European political echelons, that consisting of the EU parliament, the Member States and regional districts. It would then apply these reasons to demonstrate how the German Lander can implement subsidiarity in relation to European environmental policy and conclude by offering what it conceives as an improved comprehension of the principle and this would therefore lead to better functioning of subsidiarity within the political domain. An example demonstrating the function of subsidiarity in the way of the 13 Theses was the German legislative list.
From the outset of subsidiarity being introduced, it would be safe to concede that the principle was relatively unfamiliar with many of the EU’s Member States. Over time, however, it progressively became assimilated as acquiring a close proximity with the individual citizen and was therefore instrumental in the EU’s reconstruction from a European Community into what it is recognised today as the European Union.
During 1993-1995, both the German Lander and the Federal Government came up with lists of legislation that they insisted should be amended by definition of subsidiarity, and although the European Union did not initially favour this approach, they were eventually prepared to reconsider 13 out of 54 sections of legislation. In the case of the German Lander, it could be argued that by utilising subsidiarity it was subsequently able to wield further influence in regards to some of its regional policies, in this instance it was in relation to the EU’s environmental policy. This signifies how the presence of subsidiarity within legislation, although initially ambiguous in its description, has occupied a political function in offering authority to regional entities which was not previously attainable. This could be expanded on by claiming that subsidiarity therefore not only serves a significant political purpose but has likewise contributed to legislative reform within regional European politics.
On the other hand, critics of subsidiarity in practice will argue the legislative list was an exceptional case and will point to subsequent events that followed the Maastricht Treaty, particularly how economic burdens arose from what subsidiarity brought forth in the form of Community policies. “The Maastricht Treaty goes further than the Single European Act in promoting economic and social cohesion, making it one of the ‘tasks’ of the Community. In spite of this commitment, the prevailing economic and political climate meant that the negotiations were protracted and often contentious. In particular, growing unemployment and other economic difficulties within some northern member states heightened concerns about the costs and the cost-effectiveness of Community policies.”
Community policies incurring costs is not the only economic critique of subsidiarity, as economies of scale tend to prove the benefits of centralisation. As some public expenditure (like defence for example) would cost significantly less if it was to be supplied by one jurisdiction as oppose to several individual regions. Other bureaucratic systems such as law and education have often been proven to be more sophisticated when offered by the centralised State. In addition to this, subsidiarity can subsequently lead to the problem of spillovers. This indicates that ‘Policies implemented in one locality may have effects on the welfare of the population in another locality. For instance, the provision of secondary education by one locality may have a beneficial effect (via labour mobility) on another, which the former has no incentive to take into account when determining its level of provision.’
However, subsidiarity in the practical sense can also be perceived as economically beneficial by recognising the notion of vertical subsidiarity. Vertical subsidiarity can be deemed as a practical function not only within the political but likewise in the economical sphere, as according to Oates’ decentralisation theorem, subsidiarity can be highly efficient by the assumption that public goods or services will be better provided by decentralised public authorities. Subsidiarity can therefore serve a practical function when consumption is offered to a particular region and also appears to be more equitable in that production expenses do not differentiate between various jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, criticism of subsidiarity is not confined to economics, critics have also placed fault in the principle’s supposed futility within politics. Geelhoed (1991) ‘shows that, in practice, it is not the principle of subsidiarity that plays a decisive role in determining adequate competence at the European level, but rather the political claims of the negotiating partners.’ In addition, Van Gerven (1992) also adds to the claim of subsidiarity’s lack of autonomous political authority and purpose and considers the idea to be less significant than the principles of proportionality and co-operation. He ‘criticises the fact that the principle of subsidiarity has no significance on its own. Two other European principles are much more significant: the principle of proportionality states that any authority should exercise its competence with reserve and the co-operation principle states that the EU and Member States should co-operate while exercising their respective competencies.’
One criticism that could link back to Aquinas’s vision of subsidiarity fostering a notion of social justice and goodness could also be refuted by recognising the advantages of centralisation in terms of equity, or more precisely via redistribution within localities. This is the idea that when local regions try redistributive taxation, the social disparity between the poorest and most affluent citizens of that region may make redistribution somewhat difficult. ‘Redistribution by a central authority (that is, one covering an area beyond which the population is relatively immobile) faces no such difficulty.’
Vertical subsidiarity can be deemed as a practical function not only within the political but likewise in the economical sphere, as according to Oates’ decentralisation theorem, subsidiarity can be highly efficient by the assumption that public goods or services will be better provided by decentralised public authorities.
Another political problem that subsidiarity could coincidentally contribute to is by acting as a catalyst for nationalist sentiments and in some instances it can divert attention away from required central authorities that are needed to make up for the loss of national sovereignty. The example of the former Yugoslavia is pertinent in illustrating the point, ‘The experience of the former Yugoslavia provides an extreme case in point of the centrifugal tendencies and conflicts that can arise when subsidiarity operates as a regional/ethnic competition for funds that are distributed by a weak and non-legitimate central government. Strong regional policies and mechanisms for redistribution are essential, but these need to be under central control at the federal level, making policies in the interests of the entire union.’
One significant issue that could be classified as both an argument for the application of subsidiarity and by the same token it could be viewed as a criticism of the principle’s political function, is the issue of accountability. For proponents of centralisation policy, subsidiarity would not be as effective in that centralisation could essentially aid individuals in observing government protocol by increased awareness of its activities. Likewise, subsidiarity in relation to policies of decentralisation can utilise its political influence to the advantage of the individual by offering the opportunity to convey disapproval with their respective government if it decides to not listen to individual demands. With the application of subsidiarity within the political framework, individuals can apply the use of citizens’ mobility. This gives preference to the individual in which they can live in another district or province if they do not approve of their current government’s policies. This ultimately puts pressure on that government, as ‘The fear of losing taxpayers will act as an incentive for local governments to use resources efficiently and provide levels and kinds of public goods that reflect taxpayers’ preferences.’
Moreover, where subsidiarity appears to acquire the greatest contribution is in the various forms of efficiency that local governments may be better in establishing as oppose to central State intervention. This is most notable in the uncertainty of local conditions, and the uncertainty of local preferences. Within the uncertainty of local conditions, central or higher authorities may be less equipped in managing local municipal affairs and by potentially mismanaging local policies, this can lead to worsening conditions, furthermore where government investment has been placed. Examples may be where to situate a community waste site or where public schools and hospitals should be placed. In correspondence with this, subsidiarity can also assist in local preferences, as central governments may not acknowledge what the local people of a particular region takes into consideration or what they may prioritise. An example could be whether individuals give preference to improved road infrastructure over the preservation of rural land and wildlife. This is significant in the overall analysis of subsidiarity’s effectiveness, as it offers the opportunity for public decision making to acquire greater links with the citizen and it is in this sense that proves subsidiarity to enhance public sector accountability and inevitably make it more efficient.
Following on from the previous application of subsidiarity in relation to EU environmental policy by the German Landers, it should be noted that the principle once again highlights its benefits in favouring public consensus when addressing environmental issues. This can be seen in various examples of decentralisation across the world, particular in Latin America and Africa. ‘In Nicaragua and Bolivia, decentralised forest management has resulted in some local councils- where local councils were more open to popular influence- protecting forests against outside commercial interests. Decentralisations in Bolivia, Cameroon, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe have led to greater inclusion of some marginal populations in forestry decisions.’ The observable benefits of subsidiarity and its relation to environmental policy could offer further justification for the principle’s long-standing theological affiliation with Catholic social teaching, in that the evidence highlights what Aquinas and the Papal authority set out when prompting this notion, which refers back to the idea of a restoration of social justice and in this sense a social responsibility which all individual citizens can contribute to by formulating a viable solution to tackling social problems such as the environment. In this regard, subsidiarity could appear to be a fairer way of distributing responsibility as it enables the citizen to take a matter into their own hands and can also correspond with the higher authority in resolving certain matters (be it dealing with the council or a province for example).
In conclusion and after taking several factors into consideration, I feel that subsidiarity as an organisational principle still bears a considerable amount of influence on not only politics but on various social sectors as previously mentioned. The paper does indicate however that because of potential misunderstandings or ambiguity surrounding the notions’ definition, this has undoubtedly led to both proponents and critics of the principle and in this manner it has the dual capacity of being both instrumental within a political constitution such as in EU legislation or it could be merely perceived as futile to any discussion on the interaction between State and society and should therefore not be taken into account altogether. Regardless of the criticism, I do think that its tacit theological connection still bears influence on the way in which the principle has been applied in modern times, as the ongoing troubles within the Eurozone subsists and the global occupy movement takes place across Europe and the wider world, I feel that were subsidiarity to be a well defined and axiomatic social principle, then it is plausible to suggest that subsidiarity’s influence could be even greater if it were to actualise its initial theological objective of establishing the notion of a common social good.
School of Modern Languages, Cultures & Societies
Department of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies
University of Leeds
Leeds LS9 2JT
Copyright 2012 by Hasan Hafidh. All Rights Reserved.
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